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Marital Affection and the Medieval Lucretia
Lynn Shutters
ear the end of Chaucer’s Book of the Duchess, when the 
Black Knight describes the beauty and virtue of his beloved 
White, he compares her to Penelope and Lucretia. The use 
of such classical women as touchstones of female virtue is typical, if not 
clichéd; yet embedded in the Black Knight’s conventional rhetoric is an 
odd qualification. He comments:
She [White] was as good, so have I reste,
As ever was Penelopee of Grece,
Or as the noble wif Lucrece,
That was the beste—he telleth thus,
That Romayn, Tytus Lyvyus—
She was as good, and nothyng lyk
(Thogh hir stories by autentyk),
 Algate she was as trewe as she. (lines 1080-87, my emphasis1)
Literally, the italicized line states that White was as good as Lucretia, but 
White was nothing like Lucretia. The perfect balance of this contradic-
tion, appearing on either side of the caesura of line 1085, renders it all 
the more stark. Despite, or rather because of, its paradoxical nature, this 
line accurately sums up the status of the Lucretia legend in late medieval 
literary traditions. For medieval authors, Lucretia was simultaneously 
an exemplar of wifely chastity to which medieval women should aspire 
and a pagan whose actions and values ill fit a Christian era.
This essay considers the complications involved when medieval 
authors employed Lucretia as a model for Christian women. Specifi-
cally, I am interested in how a woman whose story culminates in suicide, 
an action deemed both sinful and despicable throughout the Middle 
Ages, could be recuperated as a viable model of Christian wifely behav-
ior.2 While there is no definitive answer to this question, a particularly 
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interesting set of answers can be gleaned from the appearance of the 
Lucretia legend as an exemplum of married chastity in Le Ménagier 
de Paris (The Goodman of Paris), a late medieval French conduct book 
purportedly written by a husband for his young wife. A concern that 
doggedly occupies the Le Ménagier narrator is how marital affection, and 
specifically the affection that his wife owes him, can be translated into 
action and thus made manifest to both himself and others. Herein, I 
contend, resides the attraction of the Lucretia legend, for, from the point 
of view of the Le Ménagier narrator, an act as extreme and irreversible as 
suicide incontrovertibly establishes Lucretia’s internal, wifely devotion. 
Despite the Le Ménagier narrator’s praise of Lucretia, his depiction of 
her extreme spousal devotion fits uneasily, and, in fact, contradictorily, 
in his larger consideration of chastity, as the narrator conveniently over-
looks the stark discrepancies between his exempla. In order to consider 
how a medieval audience might register these discrepancies, I turn to 
Christine de Pizan’s Livre de la Cité des Dames, in which we find a more 
acute consideration of how the Lucretia exemplum might be translated 
into ethical action.
The depictions of Lucretia in Le Ménagier de Paris and Christine’s 
Cité des Dames point to developments in late medieval formulations of 
marriage, particularly as those developments involve increased emphasis 
on the connection between a wife’s virtuous actions and her inner emo-
tion. Paradoxically, a pagan matron like Lucretia can stand as a model 
for medieval Christian wives partially because of the ways in which mar-
riage developed as a Christian institution after the sacramentalization of 
marriage in the twelfth century. The more Christian the institution of 
marriage became, the more the emotional bond between husband and 
wife was valued, and the better classical pagan women could exemplify 
ideal wifehood, since pagan women were not constrained by religion to 
split their love between an earthly and heavenly bridegroom or to forego 
suicide, a frequent sign of the pagan matron’s devotion to her husband.3 
Furthermore, the narrative elements of the Lucretia story, particularly 
her use of suicide to affirm her internal will, complement a widespread 
late medieval interest in the connection between a wife’s internal, emo-
tional attitude toward her husband and the external, ethical actions 
thought best to exemplify virtuous wifehood. Medieval discussions of 
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a wife’s virtue and actions suggest that a woman’s virtuous behavior 
stemmed from and established her emotional attachment to her husband. 
However, such discussions also suggest that a wife’s inner emotional 
state could be counterfeited or misrepresented so that it fails to match up 
with her actions. Because the correspondence between a wife’s actions 
and emotions involved interpretation and speculation on the part of 
others, late medieval wifely virtue became a complex affair that went well 
beyond the rote performance of duties. The appearance of Lucretia as an 
exemplary model for women in Le Ménagier de Paris is valuable because 
it makes these developments in wifely virtue readily apparent. Indeed 
the example of Lucretia suggests that only the performance of taboo 
actions (suicide) can incontrovertibly establish a wife’s internal fidelity. 
Consequently Le Ménagier de Paris is, in its treatment of Lucretia, less 
an actual manual of conduct than a fantasy of a non-existent wife.
Part of the reason why medieval authors could depict Lucretia in 
multiple, at times contradictory ways is because they had a rich legacy 
of interpretations of Lucretia from which to draw. Like many classical 
personages, the medieval Lucretia is a palimpsest figure on whom clas-
sical, patristic, and medieval interpretive traditions all left their mark. 
Therefore, before turning to Le Ménagier de Paris and the Cité des 
Dames, it will be useful to review some of the major classical and patristic 
renditions of the Lucretia legend. Examining these versions of the legend 
reveals the degree to which the nature of wifely virtue and the manner 
in which physical actions reflect or fail to reflect a woman’s internal will 
were major concerns of authors of the Lucretia legend from classical 
antiquity onward.
The two classical versions of the Lucretia legend that circulated 
most widely in the Middle Ages are found in Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita 
and Ovid’s Fasti. In both versions, Lucretia lives during the last days 
of the Roman monarchy; she is raped by Sextus Tarquinius, the son of 
Tarquinius Superbus, the seventh and final king of Rome. Lucretia’s 
rape and subsequent suicide precipitate the exile of Tarquinius Super-
bus and the foundation of the Roman Republic. As related by Livy, the 
legend contains three major narrative events: the virtue contest, the 
rape of Lucretia, and Lucretia’s suicide. The virtue contest begins not 
in Rome but at the siege of the city of Ardea, where a group of Roman 
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noblemen, including Lucretia’s husband Tarquinius Collatinus and 
the king’s son Sextus Tarquinius, entertain themselves one evening by 
debating who has the most virtuous wife. Unable to settle the debate, 
the men secretly return to Rome to spy on their wives. They find all of 
their wives feasting and enjoying themselves, except for Lucretia, who 
sits among her women weaving wool. Consequently “[t]he prize of this 
contest in womanly virtues fell to Lucretia” (Muliebris certaminis laus 
penes Lucretiam fuit).4 However, the virtue contest has an unforeseen 
outcome: “Sextus Tarquinius was seized with a wicked desire to debauch 
Lucretia by force; not only her beauty, but her proved chastity as well, 
provoked him” (201) (Sex. Tarquinium mala libido Lucretiae per vim 
stuprandae capit [1.57.10]).
The second event, the rape of Lucretia, takes place when Sextus 
Tarquinius secretly returns to Lucretia’s home, where she treats him 
as an honored guest and gives him lodging. During the night he sneaks 
into Lucretia’s room and attempts to seduce her. The virtuous Lucretia 
initially refuses, but eventually yields when Sextus threatens to kill her, 
kill a slave, and position the two as if he had caught them in the act of 
adultery. The third event, the suicide, occurs after Lucretia summons 
her husband and kinsmen and reveals what Sextus has done. Lucretia 
states: “my body only has been violated; my heart is guiltless” (203) (cor-
pus est tantum violatum, animus insons [1.58.7]). Yet despite her claim, 
and despite her husband’s and others’ similar insistence that her virtuous 
intentions can be separated from the rape suffered by her physical body, 
Lucretia states “though I acquit myself of the sin, I do not absolve myself 
from punishment; not in time to come shall ever unchaste woman live 
through the example of Lucretia” (1.203) (ego me etsi peccato absolvo, 
supplicio non libero; nec ulla dinde inpudica Lucretiae exemplo vivet 
[1.58.10-11]). She then commits suicide. Afterwards, Brutus, one of the 
men who have witnessed Lucretia’s suicide, successfully leads a revolt 
against the Tarquins. This revolt results in the foundation of the Roman 
Republic.
Particularly notable in Livy’s account of Lucretia is the dynamic 
relationship between action and intention. Initially, Lucretia’s superior 
virtue is established by her action, as she virtuously spins wool. Yet, as 
Lucretia realizes, actions gain meaning through interpretation, and 
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they are therefore subject to misinterpretation. It is for this reason 
that she surrenders to Sextus, for she realizes that even if she dies an 
unsullied woman, her purity would be meaningless if Sextus framed 
her for adultery with a slave and she lost her reputation. Even though 
she lives to tell her story and clear her name, she fears that her actions 
still might be misinterpreted; specifically, Lucretia fears that other 
women might justify unchaste activity by claiming her as a precedent. 
Therefore, despite Lucretia’s and her kinsmen’s claim that her heart 
is pure, Lucretia feels the need to realign her external actions with her 
internal will. This realignment occurs with her suicide, which removes 
any possible interpretation that she might have willingly participated 
in adultery with Sextus. 
Ovid’s version of the Lucretia legend differs from Livy’s in that, as 
Corinne Saunders notes, “Livy focuses on the political and public impact 
of the rape of Lucretia, in the context of the larger history of Rome, 
while Ovid emphasizes the sentimental, private tragedy of Lucretia, 
and presents her as the innocent victim of savage desire.”5 Ovid shows a 
heightened concern for what constitutes female virtue and the relation-
ship between a person’s physical actions and interior will. Regarding the 
virtue contest, while Livy’s Roman husbands focus only on the actions of 
their wives, whether they are feasting or spinning, Ovid focuses on what 
these actions represent. In his version of the story, the Roman husbands’ 
debate over wifely virtue is sparked by their question, “. . . are we as 
dear to our wives as they to us?” (ecquid / coniugibus nostris mutua cura 
sumus?).6 Unable to resolve their debate through verbal argument, Col-
latinus proclaims: “No need of words! Trust deeds!” (111) (non opus est 
verbis, credite rebus! [11. 734]). By implication, it appears that a woman’s 
emotional attitude toward her husband can only be established by her 
actions. This implication is borne out by the narrative; when the men 
return to Rome to spy on their wives, the description provided of Lucre-
tia is many times longer than Livy’s simple reference to her spinning. 
Ovid’s Lucretia spins with her ladies, but she also speaks, expressing her 
great concern for her husband’s wellbeing and becoming so emotional 
that she swoons. When the spying men reveal themselves to her and 
she sees Collatinus, “She revived and on her spouse’s neck she hung, a 
burden sweet” (113) (illa revixit / deque viri collo dulce pependit onus 
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[11. 759-60]). Ovid’s Lucretia is virtuous not just because of her virtuous 
actions but because those actions reflect her deep love for her husband. 
Interestingly, while Ovid’s rendering of the virtue contest heightens the 
story’s focus on the correspondence between a woman’s outward action 
and inner emotion as compared to Livy’s version, Ovid’s depiction of 
the suicide seems to downplay these issues since it lacks the extensive 
consideration of the states of the physical body and inner will that we 
find in Ab Urbe Condita. There is, in fact, very little direct discourse on 
the part of either Lucretia or her kinsmen. However, this lack of words 
seems to follow from the imperative of the virtue contest: “No need of 
words! Trust deeds!” Given this standard, Lucretia realizes that the only 
way to establish her innocent intentions is through suicide.
Augustine provides a new interpretation of Lucretia’s rape and sui-
cide in his De Civitate Dei, where he famously condemns Lucretia’s 
actions on the grounds that purity is not a state of the body but a state 
of the soul. What society thinks of a rape victim is irrelevant; only a 
woman’s standing before God matters: “Within themselves [rape vic-
tims], indeed, by the testimony of their own conscience, they have the 
glory of chastity. Moreover, they have it in the sight of God, and they 
require nothing more” (Habent quippe intus gloriam castitatis, testi-
monium conscientiae; habent autem coram oculis Dei sui nec requirunt 
amplius).7 According to Augustine, Lucretia’s suicide indicates that she 
is guilty of some sin, for, if Lucretia was forced against her will to have 
sex with Sextus, then, in committing suicide, she killed an innocent 
victim. Conversely, if Lucretia felt some pleasure in her encounter with 
Sextus, then she is guilty of adultery.8 Interestingly, despite Augustine’s 
attempt to disregard a woman’s physical body and focus instead on 
her internal will, his arguments are not so different from Livy’s. Both 
authors interpret Lucretia’s suicide as a reflection of her inner state. The 
difference is that while Livy employs this correspondence to establish 
Lucretia’s virtue, Augustine interprets it as a sign of vice. Although it 
is impossible for Augustine or anyone else to determine the nature of 
the correspondence between Lucretia’s action and intention, the cor-
respondence itself is still there. 
Although Augustine is frequently cited by medieval authors as an 
authority on the Lucretia legend, it is worth noting that his condemnation 
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of her suicide is not shared by all church fathers. Jerome provides a 
different interpretation of Lucretia in his Adversus Jovinianum, which 
circulated widely throughout the Middle Ages. While Augustine sees 
Lucretia as adhering to a spurious and superseded set of pagan values 
that emphasize public honor more than a person’s internal standing 
before God, Jerome views female purity as a construct continuous across 
the pagan and Christian eras and praises Lucretia as a virtuous model 
for Christian women. These starkly contradictory interpretations of 
Lucretia in influential theological texts contributed to the multivalence 
of medieval versions of the legend.9 
Based on Livy’s, Ovid’s, Augustine’s and Jerome’s depictions and 
interpretations of Lucretia, it is clear that this legend inspired complex 
meditations on female virtue, particularly regarding a woman’s interior 
state, which could be conceived in terms of honor (Livy), emotions 
(Ovid), spiritual standing (Augustine), or purity (Jerome) and the mani-
festation of that state in action. Late medieval authors also took interest 
in Lucretia for these reasons, although their treatment of her responded 
to particular developments in the concepts of love, marriage, and wifely 
duty. I will briefly consider these developments before turning to the 
late medieval Lucretia legends themselves.
The extensive examination and reformulation of marriage that took 
place in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which included the devel-
opment of marriage as a Christian sacrament, contributed to the belief 
that marriage was not simply a licit outlet for sexual urges or a means 
to the end of procreation but rather an institution through which par-
ticipants could attain spiritual merit.10 With the sacramentalization of 
marriage also came greater emphasis on the importance of affection 
between husband and wife. As Emma Lipton points out, “the mutual 
love between the two members of the couple . . . was [viewed as] both 
the sign and substance of God’s grace.”11 Yet, when canon lawyers, or 
parsons preaching to lay people, or lay people themselves referred to 
the “mutual love” of marriage, what did they mean? This question is 
a complicated one, and leads to the term affectio and its many mean-
ings. The term maritalis affectio was inherited from ancient Roman law, 
although, as John T. Noonan has pointed out, its meaning altered over 
time.12 According to Noonan, “maritalis affectio is a term first used in 
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classical Roman law to mean ‘intent to marry’” (481), and the concept 
was used legally to distinguish marriage from concubinage and to des-
ignate legitimate children as heirs (485). However, in the Justinian Code 
(529 CE), affectio “has an emotional tone; it means liking, inclination, 
fondness for” (487-88). The ambiguity of the term continued into the 
Middle Ages. For Gratian, affectio was a necessary element of marriage 
and appears to refer to a willingness to be married and a state of mind 
in marriage that differs from desiring one’s spouse sexually or wishing 
to procreate. After Gratian, various Popes expounded further on affectio 
in their decretals; Pope Alexander III (1159-81) “separated [affectio] from 
consent to marry and assigned [it] a new postnuptual function. . . . What 
in Justinian and Gratian had determined the existence of a marriage was 
now made the measure of its continuing quality” (500). Furthermore, 
“affection was now treated as an active disposition which the spouses had 
a duty to cultivate” (501). As a result, affectio took on a “dynamic aspect” 
that involved both an interior, emotional state and outward acts that 
express that state (502). For example, in a decretal enjoining that the 
husbands and wives of lepers continue to care for their diseased spouses, 
Pope Alexander III references affectio in such a way that leads Noonan 
to conclude that “[w]hat was being recommended was a tender loving 
attitude which would result in the care appropriate to one spouse being 
tendered by the other spouse” (503).
It appears that in the high to later Middle Ages marital affection com-
prised both the loving emotional attitude that spouses shared for each 
other and the activities that spouses performed, including a husband’s 
providing food, clothing, and shelter for his wife or a person caring 
for an ill spouse, that both stemmed from and reflected this attitude. 
Rüdiger Schnell demonstrates how this dynamic is reflected in high to 
late medieval marriage sermons; for example, in the influential collec-
tion of sermons of Peregrinus, a Dominican friar of the late thirteenth 
century, one finds the following instruction to husbands regarding wives: 
“‘You must love her in such a way that everything is as good for her as it 
is for you, in clothing, food, drink, and comforts.”13 Yet the vagueness 
of marital affection persisted; Michael M. Sheehan notes that Pope 
Innocent III (1199-1216), like his predecessors, made “no attempt . . . to 
define [affection’s] essential qualities or to establish criteria that would 
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make it possible for a court to decide whether marital affection existed 
or not.”14 Furthermore, even as a husband’s or wife’s outward actions 
were supposed to attest to an inner love for the spouse, there is at least 
some evidence suggesting a concern that actions and inner states might 
not match up. In an examination of legal disputes involving marriage in 
late medieval York, Frederik Pedersen recounts a case in which a witness 
asserts that marital affection indeed existed between a married couple, 
“so far as this witness could make out.”15 Pedersen notes that the wit-
ness’s testimony “makes it clear that she was aware that she could not 
be sure that the external signs of affection actually covered the inner 
reality of the emotion.”16
Le Ménagier de Paris also features ambiguities created by the two-
part concept of marital affection. Long before the Le Ménagier narrator 
employs Lucretia as an exemplum, his book’s preoccupation with marital 
affection, and specifically with the dynamic interrelation between a 
woman’s emotions and actions, leads to considerations of wifely virtue 
that resemble those found in the Lucretia legends. The book itself is 
allegedly the product of marital affection. In the work’s Prologue, the 
narrator claims that his new, young wife requested instruction from 
him on how to fulfill her spousal duties, and his “piteuse et charitable 
compassion” (tender compassion) for her motivates him to concede.17 
Furthermore, he tells her:
 
 . . . se vostre affection y est telle comme vous m’avez monstré 
le semblant par voz bonnes paroles, il se peut acomplir en ceste 
maniere: c’estassavoir que une lecçon generale vous sera par moy 
escripte et a vous baillee . . . . (Prologue, 80-84).
[ . . . if your affection is really as you have shown to me in such 
well-intentioned words, the lessons can be accomplished in the 
following manner: I will write and give you general instruc-
tions . . . . (50)] 
The if-clause of this statement perhaps belies an anxiety that the young 
wife’s words do not accurately reflect her affection. In writing his treatise, 
the narrator provides instruction on the actions that will better indicate 
her inner, loving state than words alone. 
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In the treatise itself the narrator insistently correlates a wife’s actions 
and her interior affection for her husband by repeatedly referencing love 
as a motive for her virtuous behavior. Sometimes such references are 
brief; at other times they are extensive, as when he states:
Par Dieu, je croy, quant deux bonnes preudegens sont mariez, 
toutes autres amours sont reculees, anichilees et oublyees fors 
d’eulx deux: et me semble que quant ilz sont presens et l’un devant 
l’autre ilz s’entreregardent plus que autres, ilz s’entrepinsent, ilz 
s’entrehurtent et ne font signe ne ne parlent voulentiers fors l’un a 
l’autre. Et quant ilz s’entreloignent si pensent ilz l’un a l’autre, et 
dient en leur cuer: “Quant je le verray je lui feray ainsi, je lui diray 
ainsi, je le prieray de tel chose.” Et tous leurs plaisirs especiaulx, 
leurs principaulx desirs et leurs parfaictes joyes, c’est de faire les 
plaisirs et obeissances l’un de l’autre. Et s’ilz ne s’entraiment il ne 
leur chault de obeissance ne de reverence fors le commun, qui est 
trop petits entre pluseurs (1.6.1181-94)
[In God’s name, I believe that when two good, virtuous people are 
married, all other loves outside of each other are remote, destroyed, 
and forgotten. It seems to me that when they are in each other’s 
presence, they look at each other more than the others, playfully 
tweak one another, press close, and do not willingly recognize or 
speak to anyone besides each other. And when they are separated, 
they think of each other, saying in their hearts, “When I see him, I 
will do this for him, say this to him, ask him about this.” All their 
private pleasures, their dearest desires and their perfect joys are sat-
isfied in pleasing and obeying the other. But if they don’t love each 
other, then they don’t value obedience and reverence more than 
does the average couple, which is, in most cases, not much (124).]
This passage begins by suggesting that internally, each spouse is only 
occupied with the other, “toutes autres amours” (all other loves) being 
“reculees, anichilees et oublyees” (remote, destroyed, and forgotten). 
This internal affection then manifests itself in actions such as tweaking 
and pressing, and, from there, inner affection appears externally in the 
form of mutual obedience, that is, performing any action which might 
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please the other. This depiction of marriage based on mutual affection 
might seem refreshing given the pervasive depictions throughout the 
Middle Ages of women as subservient to men. Yet it is important to note 
how easily this discourse of mutuality slips into hierarchy; the primary 
emphasis here, as the use of the masculine pronoun “le” as the object 
of “verray” and “prieray” indicates, is on the obedience that a wife owes 
her husband. While the wife and husband are both required to show 
affection, that affection manifests itself in different ways: for the wife, 
through obedience, for the husband, through guiding and instructing 
his wife, perhaps through books like Le Ménagier de Paris. Furthermore, 
given the fact that marriage was a sacrament and that the love between 
husband and wife was the “sign and substance of God’s grace,” the failure 
of a wife to demonstrate her affection through acts of obedience could 
be interpreted as a spiritual shortcoming. The Le Ménagier narrator 
repeatedly references this conflation of spousal and spiritual devotion, 
sometimes quite bluntly, as when, upon concluding the story of Griselda, 
he states that the point of the story is 
pour monstrer que puis que ainsi est que Dieu, l’Eglise et raison 
veullent qu’elles [wives] soient obeissans et que leurs mariz veulent 
qu’elles aient tant a souffrir, et que pour pis eschever il leur est nec-
cessité de eulx soubzmectre du tout a la voulenté de leurs mariz et 
endurer paciemment ce que leurs mariz veulent . . . . (1.6.844-49).
[to show that since God, the Church, and reason require that they 
(wives) be obedient, and since their husbands will that they have 
so much to suffer, to avoid worse they must submit themselves in 
all things to the will of their husband and endure patiently all that 
their husbands require (118).]
Indeed, the narrator goes so far as to suggest that a good wife will obey 
her husband even if he orders her to commit a sin:
Encores se mal vient par vostre courage, si dit l’en d’une femme 
mariee: “Elle fist bien, puis que son mary lui commanda; car en ce 
faisant elle fist son devoir (1.6.1133-37).
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[Even if a wrong comes from your constancy to your husband’s 
commands, it is said of a married woman, “She acted well, since her 
husband directed her; in so doing she performed her duty” (123).] 
Despite the tight rein that the narrator recommends a husband keep 
on his wife, Le Ménagier repeatedly attests to the difficulty of doing so. 
In the book husbands constantly test their wives, and, despite exceptions 
like Griselda, the women frequently fail these tests. Indeed, the work is 
filled with negative exempla of unruly women who resist their husbands’ 
control and of women whose outer actions do not conform to their inner 
will. In short, the Le Ménagier narrator is deeply anxious about women’s 
motives, particularly about women’s fidelity to their husbands, and it is 
for this reason that Lucretia is an attractive model of femininity.
The Le Ménagier narrator relates the story of Lucretia in a section of 
the book devoted to chastity, a term used here to denote marital fidelity. 
The narrator uses multiple sources for his Lucretia story, his most direct 
source being Le Jeu des Eschaz Moralisé, a mid-fourteenth century French 
translation of Jacobus de Cessolis’s Solacium ludi scacchorum, in which 
Lucretia also appears as a model of feminine chastity.18 The Le Ménagier 
narrator also claims to have seen Livy’s Lucretia legend, and, whether 
he actually used the Latin version or not, it is clear that the author drew 
from sources other than Le Jeu, since Le Jeu does not include the virtue 
contest as part of its Lucretia story, while Le Ménagier does. The Le 
Ménagier narrator’s reliance on multiple sources is at times awkward; 
for example, Sextus Tarquinius falls in love with Lucretia twice, first, 
following Le Jeu, when he meets her at a dinner at Collatinus’s home 
and later, following the tradition of Livy, during the virtue contest. 
Still, the manner in which the author combines versions of the Lucretia 
story reveals something about his interests. Given the work’s preoccupa-
tion with female virtue, and particularly with testing such virtue, the 
inclusion of the virtue contest makes sense. According to the narrator, 
Lucretia wins this contest when the men find her enclosed in her home 
praying over a book of hours—a fairly typical medieval Christianizing 
of classical myth. Yet it is not just her isolation and Christian devotion 
that render her virtuous. The narrator relates:
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et fut trouvé que lors ne autres foiz, toutes foiz que son mary 
Colatin estoit hors, et en quelque compaignie ou feste qu’elle fust, 
il n’estoit nul ne nulle qui la veist dancer ne chanter, se ce n’estoit 
seulement le jour qu’elle avoit letters de lui ou qu’il retournast la 
veoir; . . . (1.4.256-61).
[and it was found that neither then nor any time when her husband 
Collatinus was away, in whatever company or celebration she  
was, had man or woman seen her dance or sing, except on the day 
when she received letters from him or when he returned to see  
her (90-91).]
 
This detail does not appear in Le Jeu. By connecting Lucretia’s pleasure 
to her husband, the narrative takes on an emotional tinge reminiscent 
of Ovid’s Lucretia legend and, in so doing, suggests that at the core of 
Lucretia’s virtuous actions is marital affection. Similarly, when Lucretia 
tells her husband that Sextus has raped her, she prioritizes his honor 
over hers, telling him first that Sextus “a ton lit deshonnoré” (1.4.298) 
(has dishonored your bed [91]) before referencing her dishonored body. 
This detail follows Le Jeu and departs from Livy, in which Lucretia first 
references her honor before referring to her husband’s defiled bed. Thus 
the narrator appears to follow and depart from sources in a fashion that 
emphasizes Lucretia’s inner affection for her husband. Likewise, Col-
latinus’s love for Lucretia is emphasized; it is he alone, and not her other 
kinsmen, who seeks to comfort her upon learning of the rape. Here we 
see the mutuality of the affectionate bond that, in the later Middle Ages, 
was supposed to typify the relationship between husband and wife.
Despite the narrator’s updating of the classical Lucretia legend with 
a book of hours and an affectionate marriage, the story inevitably ends 
with Lucretia’s pagan suicide. Upon concluding the story, the narrator 
merely instructs the wife that this is an example to follow for “garder 
son mariaige ou chasteté” (1.4.344) (protecting marriage or chastity 
[92]). This instruction seems glib. If necessary, is a wife supposed to 
commit suicide, an act greatly condemned in medieval Christian cul-
ture? Yet, while virtuous suicide is a concept belonging to the values of 
pagan Rome, not medieval Christendom, the attraction of suicide in 
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the context of this conduct book can be attributed to medieval devel-
opments in marriage. If marital affection was supposed to consist of 
corresponding internal emotions and external actions, then questions 
could emerge regarding this correspondence. What if a wife performed 
virtuous behavior by rote, without possessing the appropriate inner 
emotions? What actions were so extreme that they could unequivocally 
testify to the woman’s inner state? In classical versions of the Lucretia 
legend, the irrevocability of suicide operates as a means for Lucretia to 
insure that her encounter with Sextus would be interpreted as rape rather 
than adultery. Similarly, for the Le Ménagier narrator, Lucretia’s suicide 
guarantees that her devotion to her husband is genuine.
The use of Lucretia as an example of marital chastity is complicated 
by the narrator’s other major example of chastity, Susanna, who better 
exemplifies an Augustinian notion of chastity than the version of chastity 
exemplified by Lucretia. The Susanna story is set in Old Testament 
Israel, where Susanna is a Hebrew matron. Two judges attempt to 
seduce her, but she refuses them. Angered, the judges threaten to accuse 
Susanna of adultery if she does not give in to their desires. Susanna still 
refuses on the grounds that adultery is a sin, and her standing before God 
is more important than her worldly reputation. The judges make their 
accusation and condemn Susanna to death. However, the boy-prophet 
Daniel intervenes. Through his divinely inspired cleverness, the truth 
comes out, Susanna’s life is saved, and her reputation redeemed.
The Lucretia and Susanna stories are notably similar in plot but 
different in ethical action. Both Lucretia and Susanna are given the 
same rather bleak set of options. Each woman can either preserve her 
physical chastity, in which case she will lose her honorable reputation 
and her life, or she can submit to being raped and live with her worldly 
reputation intact. Yet, faced with the same options, the two women 
make different decisions. Lucretia gives up her physical chastity so as 
not to lose her honor; the text reads: “Et celle qui doubta plus la honte 
du monde que la mort, si se consenti” (1.4.288-89) (So she, who feared 
more to be shamed before the world than to die, consented to lie with 
Sextus [91]). As mentioned above, the text also links Lucretia’s decision 
to her marital affection. Susanna makes the opposite decision, choos-
ing to maintain her physical chastity. In her deliberations, she never 
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mentions her husband; instead, she turns to God: 
Dieux, dit elle, angoisses sont a moy de toutes pars; car se je fais 
ceste chose, morte suis comme a Dieu, et se je ne le fay, je ne 
pourray eschapper de leurs mains que ne soie tormentee et lapide. 
Mais mieulx me vault sans mesfaire cheoir en leur dangier que faire 
pechié devant Dieu (1.4.94-99).
[“God,” she said, “miseries surround me, because if I do this, I will 
be dead to God, and if I don’t do it, I won’t be able to escape from 
their hands without being tortured and stoned. But better that I 
fall into their trap, without committing a wrong, than to sin before 
God” (87).] 
These discrepancies between Susanna’s and Lucretia’s actions raise sev-
eral questions. Is chastity a physical state of sexual monogamy, or does 
it entail a concern for one’s reputation and husband that cannot always 
preclude extramarital sex? Does one maintain chastity out of devotion 
to one’s God or one’s husband? Based on the fact that both Susanna 
and Lucretia can operate as exempla of chastity, it would appear that, 
at least in the context of this late medieval conduct book, such either/or 
questions are impossible to answer. Lucretia’s chastity better conforms 
to the model of sacramental marriage in which marital affection and 
devotion to one’s husband are emphasized, while Susanna’s chastity 
is presented as a religious mandate from God. That these two models 
conflict points to the multiple, at times competing notions of marital 
chastity in circulation at this time. It is of course much easier and more 
ideologically expedient to assume that a wife’s devotion to her husband 
and God would converge rather than conflict, and this is an assumption 
that the Le Ménagier narrator makes throughout his book.
The impossibility of a single woman emulating the actions of both 
Susanna and Lucretia should her chastity be threatened also opens up 
questions about how much, or how little, even a text like Le Ménagier, 
which is seemingly devoted to thinking about female action, can really 
consider how women act and the consequences those actions have. In 
other words, because the Le Ménagier narrator cannot acknowledge the 
conflicts within the concept of chastity and the exempla that illustrate 
77
it, he also cannot meaningfully consider how a woman might translate 
feminine chastity into ethical action. This accounts for the glib conclu-
sion to the Lucretia legend mentioned above. As for the Susanna legend, 
the narrator concludes not by considering how a medieval woman should 
act in Susanna’s situation, but rather by showering Susanna with copi-
ous praise and then considering the Old Testament law condemning 
adulterous women to death by stoning, a practice which the narrator 
claims continues in his own day. The narrator is quite an admirer of 
this punishment, and he urges contemporary Christians to continue 
the practice: “Mesmes les mauvaiz [the Jews] tiennent ceste loy, et 
nous devons bien tenir, car c’est bonne loy” (1.4.165-67) (Since even the 
wicked [the Jews] keep this law, we must keep it also, for it is a good law 
[88]). The narrator’s shift from considering Susanna as an example for 
married women to considering this Jewish punishment as an example 
for Christians perhaps registers a difficulty with how precisely he might 
use Susanna as a model for married women, given his interests in spousal 
devotion and Susanna’s lack of concern for her husband.
The Le Ménagier narrator is certainly neither the first nor only Chris-
tian author to gloss over the practical implications of his exempla, and, 
with a story like Lucretia’s, which ends in suicide, perhaps the only 
way to employ her as an exemplum of female virtue is to avoid consid-
ering how her actions might be translated into a Christian worldview. 
An author who attempts to make such considerations is Christine de 
Pizan, who retells the Lucretia legend in her Livre de la Cité des Dames. 
Christine’s interest in how models of femininity in literary texts affect the 
lives of actual women is evident throughout her career; obvious examples 
of this interest include her participation in the Querelle de la Rose and 
her framing of the Cité des Dames as a reconsideration of misogynistic 
literary depictions of women.19 The Cité des Dames famously opens 
with the narrator Christine reading a misogynistic book with surprise 
and confusion as she is unable to reconcile this book’s and other similar 
ones’ depictions of women’s mores as “enclins et plains de tous les vices” 
(inclined to and full of every vice) with her own experience as a woman 
and her interactions with actual women, both of which countered the 
book’s characterizations of femininity.20 Christine presents the Cité des 
Dames as her attempt to rewrite the stories of exemplary women so that 
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they better conform to her own comprehension of female experience.
One of these stories is the Lucretia legend. Although Christine can-
not alter the unpleasant narrative elements of this story, she frames 
and rearranges them in a way that demonstrates her interest in the 
applicability of literary texts to everyday lives. Christine relates the story 
of Lucretia in Part Two of the Cité des Dames, but she does so in two 
different sections, and in so doing, she divides the legend’s three main 
narrative elements, the virtue contest, the rape, and Lucretia’s suicide. At 
Lucretia’s first appearance in the Cité des Dames, her rape and suicide are 
narrated, but not the virtue contest. The heading preceding the Lucretia 
legend indicates that the purpose of the legend is to refute the belief 
that women enjoy being raped. Whether women experienced pleasure 
during rape was a concern in the Middle Ages, and, given Augustine’s 
influential commentary on the Lucretia legend, Lucretia could be used 
to affirm that such pleasure was indeed possible. Saunders points out 
that “Christine’s choice to tell the story of Lucrece here [under the 
above-mentioned heading] suggests her awareness that the history of 
Lucrece engages more directly with the issue of pleasure in rape than any 
other legend.”21 Consequently Christine frames the legend in a way that 
counters readings of Lucretia that could be used to condemn women for 
experiencing carnal pleasure during rape. Christine concludes this first 
narration of the Lucretia legend with Lucretia’s suicide, the expulsion of 
the Tarquins, and then this seemingly original addition to the story:
 
Et a cause de cel oultraige fait a Lucresce, comme dient aucuns, 
vint la loy que homme mourroit pour prendre femme a force; 
laquelle loy est couvenable, juste et sainte (887).
[And because of this outrage perpetrated on Lucretia, so some 
claim, a law was enacted whereby a man would be executed for rap-
ing a woman, a law which is fitting, just, and holy (162).] 
Karen Casebier notes that, “by inventing a fictional law that makes rape 
a capital crime, Christine removes a fatal precedent by which women 
should judge their own responses to rape. In doing so, she not only 
erases the severe measure allowed for victims of male violence, she also 
places the moral responsibility for sexual aggression on the males who 
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instigate rape . . .”22 In other words, the ethical action that Christine 
endorses is not that raped women should commit suicide but rather that 
men should not commit acts of sexual violence in the first place. 
Christine also distances Lucretia’s exemplary virtue from her suicide 
in her second telling of the legend later in Part Two of the Cité des 
Dames, which focuses on the virtue contest, Rectitude, the allegorical 
narrator of Part Two, introduces the Lucretia legend with the point that 
men love women more for their virtue than their beauty. She illustrates 
this point with the story of how Tarquin the Proud (Christine’s name 
for Sextus Tarquinius) comes to desire Lucretia. The virtue contest is 
then narrated: the Roman men spy on their wives to prove whose is 
the most virtuous; Lucretia wins the contest, and Tarquin falls in love 
with her specifically on account of her virtue. Lucretia’s rape is alluded 
to, but not narrated, and no mention is made of her eventual suicide. 
While Lucretia exemplifies chastity, this chastity no longer requires the 
extreme act of suicide in order to be established. Christine translates the 
Lucretia legend into practical action, and she distances the legend from 
exemplifying acts that are both undesirable and morally impossible for 
a Christian woman.
Clearly, Christine’s interpretation of the Lucretia legend could not 
be more different from the Le Ménagier narrator’s, even though they 
both recount the same basic narrative. Christine’s recuperation of the 
legend is only possible through her radical reframing of it, as she literally 
pulls the legend apart. What is most striking about Christine’s Lucretia 
legend is not the actions of Lucretia herself but rather the interpretative 
decisions of Christine the author. Because Christine’s interpretation of 
Lucretia takes precedence over Lucretia’s actions, the acts of reading and 
interpreting are themselves highlighted as ethical actions. Consequently 
Christine’s formal treatment of Lucretia upholds a major theme of the 
Cité des Dames as a whole, that moral exempla must be read not as con-
veyors of universal values but as products of the interests of particular 
authors, and that therefore authors have an ethical responsibility for 
how they convey classical legends to their audiences.
 In conclusion, the Lucretia legend is an important site for both 
disseminating and countering predominant late medieval ideologies of 
wifely chastity in Le Ménagier de Paris and the Cité des Dames. The 
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complex portrait of marriage that informs and emerges from medieval 
Lucretia legends is significant in that it helps scholars to re-historicize 
marriage, an endeavor of increasing significance as histories of marriage 
are brought to bear on present-day debates about the institution. A belief 
that permeates popular culture is that marriage in the Middle Ages was 
essentially loveless, and a number of popular histories of marriage trace 
a narrative of progress from a time when love was irrelevant to marriage 
(i.e., the Middle Ages) to more recent times, when love is touted as the 
defining characteristic of marriage.22 The particular ways in which medi-
eval authors, including the author of Le Ménagier de Paris, frame and 
adapt the Lucretia legend demonstrate the degree to which an emotional 
attachment which we might term “love” played an important part in late 
medieval formulations of marriage. However, formulations of marital 
love in the Middle Ages differ significantly from such versions of love 
today, and to make recourse to a transhistorical notion of love would be 
to repeat an offense to which James Schultz and Karma Lochrie have 
notably drawn attention, that medieval gender studies remains overly 
indebted to modern formulations of gender and sexuality.23 Consequently 
consideration of medieval Lucretia legends requires a delicate balancing 
act between conceiving of the medieval past exclusively in terms of either 
sameness or difference. As such, medieval Lucretia legends might help 
us not only to excavate concepts of marriage from the medieval past, 
but also to consider new historicist methodologies for making that past 
relevant to the present.
An earlier version of this essay was presented at the sixteenth annual 
International Medieval Congress at Leeds in 2009. I would like to thank 
the participants and audience members of that session for their helpful 
comments.
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